V. Emotions and the Problem of Other Minds

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Can consideration of the emotions help to solve the problem of other minds? Intuitively, it should. We often think of emotions as public: as observable in the body, face, and voice of others. Perhaps you can simply see another's disgust or anger, say, in her demeanour and expression; or hear the sadness clearly in his voice. Publicity of mind, meanwhile, is just what is demanded by some solutions to the problem. But what does this demand amount to, and do emotions actually meet it? This paper has three parts. First, I consider the nature of the problem of other minds. Second, I consider the publicity of emotions. And third, I bring these together to show how emotions can help to solve the problem.

Traditionally, there are two problems of other minds: one epistemological, one conceptual. The epistemological problem asks how you can know, or how you can be justified in believing, that another person has a mind at all: that there exist other subjects of experience. The conceptual problem asks how you can so much as understand that there could exist other minds or subjects of experience: how you can have the concept of another's mind or experience. But why suppose these problems exist? They both arise, in part, from the same idea. This is the idea of an ontological distinction between experience (mind) and behaviour (body): they are not the same type of thing.

The idea is intuitive. Consider, for instance, the possibility of pretence. Another person may be carrying on as if in pain, say, grimacing and crying out, but not be in pain at all. Yet you might be wholly taken in by her performance. There may be no discernible difference between real and pretend behaviour. Now pretence is not, nor perhaps could it ever be, the norm. But what it brings to the fore is the possibility of a discrepancy between experience and behaviour. If you can know how another is behaving, yet mistake her experience, the most obvious explanation is that her behaviour is observable, while her experience is hidden from view. Thus the distinction between the two.

The result of this distinction is that the only experience you can
experience, as it were, is that which you have: your own. Even in principle, let alone in practice, you cannot get inside another’s head and into her mind, as if to try to have her experience. All you can experience of another is what you can observe: not her experience, but her body and behaviour. Given this, it is relatively simple to see why there is, at least prima facie, an epistemological problem. How can observation of another’s behaviour be a sufficient basis for knowing that she possesses this other, distinct, kind of thing: a mind or experience? But it is less simple to see why there is a conceptual problem. If the only experience you can experience is that which you have, then to be sure, you can only understand what experience is from your own case. But why is this insufficient to account for your understanding of another’s mind or experience?

It is sometimes claimed that the problem lies in an unwarranted use of the notion of sameness of type of experience in the account. Consider the classic argument from analogy and its equally classic criticism. The argument from analogy claims that you understand what pain, say, is from your own case: because you have it. Pain is just that wretched experience you sometimes suffer. It may be that, in absence of certain general intellectual capacities, or certain behavioural effects and social surroundings, you could not come to have this concept. But these are not part of what pain itself in essence is: pain is just that wretched experience. Given this, what it is for another to be in pain is for it be the same for her as it is for you when you are in pain: for her to have the same type of experience. The primary importance of behaviour, according to this account, is that it enables you to tell whether another is in pain. But since behaviour is distinct from experience, you can make mistakes.

There is no doubt that this account of our concept of pain, and its application to others, is intuitive. But it is classically charged with begging the question. The reason given is that its answer to the question of how you understand what it is for another to be in pain makes use of the notion of it being the same for her as it is for you when you are in pain: of her having the same type of experience. But your understanding of how another could have experience, same or different from you, is precisely what the conceptual problem is supposed to be about.

This criticism itself begs the question against the question of why there is a conceptual problem. It does not explain why understanding what experience is from your own case is insufficient to account for your understanding of another’s mind or experience. For if the first premise of the argument from analogy is granted, namely, that you understand what pain is from your own case, then
you are perfectly entitled to say that what it is for another to be in pain is for it to be the same for her as it is for you when you are in pain. For you understand what pain is. In effect, you have a concept of pain. If there is a conceptual problem, it must be because your own case is not a sufficient basis to account for this understanding. But the question, once again, is why this should be.

There is another way of explaining what the problem is. If you understand what pain is from your own case, then pain is just that wretched experience you sometimes suffer. But when another is in pain, there is none of that wretched experience around. The most you could hope to have experience of is something different in kind: her behaviour. So how can you understand that there is pain when there is no pain to experience? It is as if you said: what it is for another to be in pain is for there to be pain, but for there not to be. Now this contradiction is, in a sense, what we want to say. For it is certainly correct that what it is for another to be in pain is for there to be pain for her, but for there not to be pain for you. But to understand this, you must have the concept of a subject of experience, applicable to yourself and to others. And there seems little prospect of possessing the concept of such a subject without also possessing the concept of a mind or experience, applicable not only to yourself but to others. But that is what is now in question. If you understand what pain is from your own case, then pain is just that wretched experience. But how then can there be pain when there is no such experience?

This way of explaining the problem brings to the fore the extent to which it presumes a kind of empiricism about concepts. The problem pushes to its limit the idea that it is through experience that you understand what there is. If only you could experience the experience of others, the problem would be solved. This is the source of the demand that the mind of others must be publicly manifest: not hidden, but open to you to experience.

But of course, you cannot have another’s experience. What you can experience of others is what you can observe: their bodies and behaviour. So if the problem is to be solved in this direct, empiricist way, then the demand for a public manifestation of the mind is a demand that behaviour be a part of the mind. Our concept of mind must in some sense encompass the behaviour which we observe. The question, then, is what sense this is. Here are three possible models.

The first is the simplest. The mind can be equally and unambiguously instantiated in experience and behaviour. So the behaviour you observe, like the experience you have, just is a state
of mind. You do not observe the effects of another’s pain, say, or the fact that she is in pain: what you observe is nothing less than her pain. Call this ‘the observational model’. According to this model, behaviour is not a way of telling another’s state of mind. Observation is a way of telling another’s state of mind. Her behaviour just is her state of mind thus observed. In essence, the existence of an ontological distinction between what you have and what you observe—experience and behaviour—is rejected outright. Both can be states of mind, and in this, ontologically on a par.

The difficulty with the observational model is that claiming the distinction must be rejected is not to show how it can be. Certainly your own experience is a paradigm instance of a mind. And certainly there is no problem, at least for present purposes, understanding how another could exhibit behaviour. So if we could understand how experience and behaviour could be the same type of thing, then we could understand how another could have a mind. But how to understand this? How could experience and behaviour be the same type of thing?

The second model shies away from the rejection of the distinction. Behaviour is not a state of mind, but it can constitute ‘logically adequate criteria’ for the ascription to others of states of mind. Call this ‘the criterial model’. So what are logically adequate criteria?

Sometimes they are defined negatively. Peter Strawson, for instance, claims that if we do not conceive of behaviour as logically adequate criteria, we should need to conceive of it as ‘signs of the presence, in the individual concerned, of this different thing, viz. the state of consciousness’ (1959, 105–6). But to conceive of behaviour thus is to have no escape from the conceptual problem. Hence we must conceive of behaviour as logically adequate criteria.

As it stands, this negative definition faces a dilemma. Either behaviour is a state of mind, or it is not and the two are distinct. If it is, then the criterial model collapses into the observational model. Indeed, when Strawson feels forced to put his point ‘with a certain unavoidable crudity’ he appears to advocate the observational model (108). Taking depression as his example, Strawson proposes that ‘X’s depression is something, one and the same thing, which is felt, but not observed, by X, and observed, but not felt, by others than X’ (109). On the other hand, if behaviour is distinct from experience, then it can be at most a way of telling what another is experiencing. What the criterial model claims is that this way of telling is ‘logical’. One question is how there could be a logical connection between two distinct things. Another is why this should matter.
In relation to the first question, consider a proposal by John McDowell (1998). McDowell is a proponent of the disjunctive conception of perceptual experience. This is the view that the possibility of perceptual illusion must not be taken to show that there is, ontologically speaking, something in common between veridical perceptual experience and illusion: i.e. how things seem to the subject. Perceptual experience comes in two distinct varieties: veridical perception, and illusion. Just so, McDowell thinks, behaviour itself comes in two distinct varieties: veridical behaviour, and pretence and the like. The possibility of pretence—of a discrepancy between experience and behaviour—must not be taken to show that there is, ontologically speaking, something in common between veridical behaviour and pretence: i.e. how it appears to an observer. Even though you may not be able to tell whether another is deceiving you or not, that is no reason to think that the behaviour is the same in either case. Call this view ‘the disjunctive conception of behaviour’. So there is a logical connection between experience and behaviour because whether a piece of behaviour counts as being of one ontological variety or another depends on the nature of the behaving subject’s experience.

Consider now the second question: why should this matter? McDowell proposes that the disjunctive conception of behaviour allows us to deny that another’s behaviour just is her state of mind, while yet maintaining that her behaviour ‘does not fall short of’ her state of mind (387). For if we accept both disjunctive conceptions, then when you veridically perceive another’s veridical behaviour, your perceptual experience could not have the content it does were the other not having the experience she is. In this sense, her experience is supposed to be manifest to you.

It is possible that McDowell’s proposal can help to solve the epistemological problem. This will depend on whether or not knowledge or justified belief requires that you be able to tell to which side of the disjunct your own perceptual experience, and another’s behaviour, falls. But it is wholly unclear why this proposal should matter to the conceptual problem. All the disjunctive conception of behaviour achieves is the introduction of an ontological distinction within the category of behaviour. Because this distinction is drawn by appeal to experience, there is a logical connection between the two. But it is still the case that the only mind you experience is your own. What you can experience of others is only their behaviour—whichever variety of behaviour this is.

The third model seeks to steer between the claim that behaviour
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is a state of mind, and the claim that behaviour is a way of telling the state of mind of another. The idea is that an appreciation of a link between experience and behaviour is a constraint upon possession of the concept of experience. Only if you appreciate this link do you understand what experience, and so too the mind, is. Call this 'the behavioural-constraint model'. For our purposes, the precise nature of this link can be left open. One idea might be that you can only possess the concept of experience if you appreciate that behaviour is a way of telling about the experience of another (Davidson, 2001). Another idea might be that you can only possess the concept of experience if you appreciate that experience enables intentional behaviour directed towards the objects of experience (Peacocke, 1984).

What we need to ask about this model is why the resulting concept of experience is such that you can understand how another could have it. For it is still the case that the only experience you experience is your own. I think the intuition driving this model is as follows. The model accepts that there is a generality constraint on the possession of the concept of experience which must be respected: only if you have a concept of experience which is generally applicable, to others as much as yourself, can you have the concept at all (Evans, 1982; Strawson, 1959). Now you have experience. And you observe behaviour. So you can only possess the concept of experience if you appreciate that experience has a link to behaviour, because only then will you be able to understand that another’s observed behaviour is linked to her had experience. The idea is that your possession of a general concept of experience can be manifest in your capacity to read or interpret the behaviour of others as more than crudely physical: that is, as related to a mind.

But to seek to respect this generality constraint is not to solve the problem. On the one hand, perhaps we could solve the problem, while rejecting the constraint. You might think that our concept of experience is generally applicable, and that we can explain how this can be, but reject the idea that this is how things must be. Perhaps there could be a subject whose concept of experience is utterly solipsistic. Ours is not. On the other hand, to accept the constraint is not in itself to make intelligible how our concept of experience is generally applicable: how you can so much as understand how another could have a mind or experience. The behavioural-constraint model in no way addresses this question of how. It claims only that so it must be.

The objection to both the criterial model, and the behavioural-constraint model, is really that they leave the ontological distinction
between experience and behaviour intact. No matter the philosophical nuance of these models, they accept that the only mind you can experience is your own. Contrast this with the observational model. If the mind can be equally and unambiguously instantiated in experience and behaviour, then it is perfectly intelligible how you can understand how another could have a mind. For you observe her states of mind when you observe her, just as you experience your own by having them. Certainly there are different ways of telling about someone’s state of mind, depending on whether the owner is you or another. But what is ascribed in each case is the same.

But once again, the problem with the observational model is that, in this abstract form, it is utterly incredible. Not only is the ontological distinction intuitive. But there seems to be nothing in common between experience and behaviour: no respect in which they are the same, and so no prospect of explaining how they could be. Given this, the model makes another’s mind so public as not to appear to be a mind at all.

This is what motivates turning to the emotions to solve the problem. If the problem is to be solved in a direct, empiricist way, then the mind must be observable. And some emotions appear to be just that.

Why should emotions be observable? The beginning of an answer is nothing more than a fact about the human species. Humans are phylogenetically endowed with what are called ‘affect programmes’: automatic, co-ordinated responses to an elicitor, involving distinctive facial and bodily expression and movement patterns, changes in voice tone and loudness, changes in hormone balance and level, and changes in the autonomic nervous system (Darwin, 1998; Ekman, 1992). There exist such programmes for fear, anger, disgust, joy, sadness, and possibly too contempt, sympathy, jealousy, and shame or embarrassment. Now some emotions are not associated with affect programmes: for instance, nostalgia. And some instances of emotions which are associated with affect programmes endure far longer than the duration of any one such programme, and no doubt are characterized as much or more by appeal to certain sorts of thoughts and actions: for instance, a parent’s fear for a child with cancer. Nonetheless, these distinctive bodily changes prototypically do occur when humans are in the grip of the relevant emotions. And certainly they can be observed. So if emotions can be partially identified with these changes themselves, as opposed, say, to being their causes, then emotions can be observed. The question is whether it is possible to explain why this identification should be.
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Consider William James’s defence of a comparable idea (1884). James notoriously claims that upon becoming aware of (or sub-personally processing) something of potential emotional significance, such as a dangerous animal, or a personal insult, ‘bodily changes follow directly the PERCEPTION of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur IS the emotion’ (190–1). His defence of this is simple: ‘If we fancy some strong emotion, and then try to abstract from our consciousness of it all the feelings of its characteristic bodily symptoms, we find we have nothing left behind, no “mind-stuff” out of which the emotion can be constituted, and that a cold and neutral state of intellectual perception is all that remains’ (193).

James’s thought has two parts. The first is that without the presence of affect, there is nothing emotional about a state at all: this is what makes a state count as an emotion, as opposed to a mere cognition. This point is fundamental. At least paradigmatically, emotions are unlike beliefs or judgments, say, but like sensations, in that they are felt. Simply believing that an animal is a threat, or judging that you have been insulted, does not suffice to make it the case that you feel fear or anger: the presence of affect is essential. The second is that the nature of this affect is bodily. James thinks that at least for us, the body, not the mind, is the right sort of domain or medium for feeling: an emotion cannot be constituted out of ‘mind-stuff’.

Reflecting on what it is like to be in the grip of many a strong emotion, it is certainly intuitive that the feeling is bodily. You might, for instance, immediately imagine having certain sensations, like the feeling of a pounding heart, or a lump in the throat, or a sinking stomach. Indeed, James is classically read as identifying emotions with just such particular, located sensations. Thus interpreted, his theory is often derided. For paradigmatically, emotions are not only felt, but intentional. In this respect, they are like beliefs or judgments, and unlike sensations: they are about or directed towards objects outside of the body. For instance, you might be scared of the dangerous animal, or angry at the person who delivered the insult. Any plausible account of the emotions must be able to accommodate not only their affect, but their intentionality. If fear or anger is nothing more than, say, the feeling of a pounding heart, this can appear difficult.

But it is possible that James is correct that the affect of many emotions is bodily, without emotions being identical to particular, located sensations. We can draw a distinction between a sensation felt at a particular place in or on your body, and the way your body, as a whole, feels.
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Michael Martin has drawn attention to the fact that each of us has a sort of awareness of our bodies from the inside as spatially configured one way and not another within a larger space: we enjoy conscious proprioception (1993). Consider, for instance, the experience of closing your eyes and stretching your arms in front of your body. You are aware of the span of your arms across and within a larger space. There is space between your arms, and also between your arms and your torso: space where your body is not positioned. In this way, as Martin notes, you are aware of your body as bounded, as limited, as occupying a volume of space within a larger space. This awareness of your body is awareness of it as, in a sense, located: as being placed within a larger space.

Once we recognize that we have a form of awareness of our whole bodies, we can see how a bodily feeling can be more than the feeling of particular, located sensations, however prominent these may be. On the one hand, there may be an overall feeling to the body due to a change in hormone balance or the nervous system: of energy, lethargy, anxiety, etc. Such feelings seem to encompass the body: to fill or suffuse it, as opposed to being located at discrete places within it. Yet we can still make sense of the idea that these feelings are felt to be located. They are felt to be located in that they encompass a body which is itself felt to be located. On the other hand, there may be an awareness of facial and body expressions and patterns of movement. Consider, for instance, the relevance of posture to an overall feeling of joy on the one hand, or sadness on the other. Or the feeling of tensely clenching the fists and jaw when angry. Or the feeling of shaking with fear. In these and similar cases, the feeling is literally of a bodily configuration or movement.

When in the grip of certain emotions, a slew of distinctive physiological and expressive bodily changes naturally occur: this is simply a fact about our species. But we have a form of awareness of our whole bodies from the inside. So we can explain the affect of these emotions simply: as the way your body, as a whole, feels when undergoing these changes.

This, in turn, can explain why emotions should be partially identified with bodily changes, as opposed, say, to being their causes. In contrast with ‘cold and neutral’ cognitions, emotions are, at least paradigmatically, affective. And affect just is the way your body, as a whole, feels when undergoing these changes. So at least some emotions are what we might think of as whole bodily states: states consisting in bodily changes which feel, or are experienced as being, a certain way from the inside.

Is it intelligible that emotions, thus conceived, could be intentional?
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It is not obviously implausible that they might be. The reason is simply the intimate relation that your body bears to you. But an explanation of this bodily intentionality is yet required. I want to suggest two.

The first depends on the fact that the intentionality of many emotions is fundamentally different from the intentionality of a cognitive state like a judgment, or a belief: it can be open. On the one hand, some emotions blend into moods. They may not have an object, or their object may be anything and everything. So there may be no intentionality in need of explanation. You can just be feeling sad. On the other hand, you may know perfectly well which type of emotion you are experiencing, but neither immediately nor with authority know what the emotion is about (Pears, 1975). Consider, for instance, running into an old flame after many years, but finding to your surprise that you feel saddened as opposed to happy by the chance encounter. You might be certain that the cause of your feeling is the encounter. What you do not understand is what this feeling is about: the reason why seeing her has made you feel this way. You might run through a number of different explanations, believing each true until the next occurs. You might or might not ultimately reach the truth (Taylor, 1985).

Given this openness, one way to explain emotional intentionality is by appeal to the subject’s own understanding of the reason why she is feeling as she is. For instance, when you come to realize that you are sad because you miss her still, say, that is what makes your emotion intentional: about the fact that you miss her. Of course, our understanding of many of our emotions is much easier to come by: it may be palpably apparent to you that you are angry at him because he insulted you. Nonetheless, this is a simple way to account for emotional intentionality: what makes your emotion intentional is that you understand the reason why you are in such a state, and so an emotion will not be intentional if you utterly lack understanding of the reason why you are in such a state.

Note that this suggestion does not deny that a subject’s understanding of the reason why she is feeling as she is can be better or worse, right or wrong. The claim is not that the subject’s understanding of this reason is constitutive of the actual reason why she is feeling as she is, but only of the feeling’s intentionality. What must be denied is only that in absence of any understanding on the part of the subject, the existence of this reason itself makes an emotion intentional.

I think the intuitive objection to this explanation is that it fails to capture the phenomenology of at least some emotions. You might think, for instance, of the way adults, children, and even other mammals, have an instinctive fear of snakes. Is it really credible that
the directedness of this emotion depends on an understanding, however tacit or inarticulate, of why it is felt? This seems a bit much. We might put this point by saying that there seems to be an evident or immersed intentionality to some emotions.

One way to try to accommodate this point is simply to reflect more fully on the phenomenology of bodily feeling. This is the second explanation of bodily intentionality. For when the object of the emotion is actually present, then and there in the subject’s vicinity, it is possible that the body itself possesses all the intentionality which is required. In such cases, the body is likely to be spatially oriented in relation to the object. Most basically, it may be withdrawing or approaching: literally directed towards or away from the object. But within these basic modes, there are many kinds of bodily engagement. For this reason, a subject’s awareness of her body from the inside can be an awareness of it as directed towards or away from objects in the world: the bodily feeling has an intrinsic intentionality. Of course, this is not a possible explanation of the intentionality of an emotion for which the object is only imagined, or exists in the remembered past or anticipated future. But for such emotions, it is much more plausible that the explanation of their intentionality can proceed via the subject’s own understanding of it.

How does this help with the problem of other minds? Recall that what is needed is an understanding of how the mind could be observable. How could experience and behaviour both be states of mind, ontologically on a par, when in the abstract there seems to be nothing in common between them?

Consider now the claim that some emotions are whole bodily states consisting of bodily changes which feel, or are experienced as being, a certain way from the inside. When the body instantiating such a state is your own, you can be aware of it from the inside: you can have a feeling or experience of emotion. When the body instantiating such a state is another’s, you can observe that state from the outside: you can observe another’s emotion. The feeling or experience that you have, and the behaviour of another that you observe, are the same type of thing: an emotion. This is perfectly intuitive. The reason why is that, with respect to these emotions, there is something in common between experience and behaviour. Your body feels, or is experienced as being, a certain way when undergoing these bodily changes, and these bodily changes are precisely what is observable in others. Emotions can solve the conceptual problem.
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There is a basic objection to this solution. Consider, for instance, how you sometimes lack all awareness of your body when in the grip of an emotion. Safe from a wild animal, say, you might comment that you had been too scared to feel scared: your attention was wholly occupied with escape. Given that the bodily changes can occur without you having a feeling or experience, there is room to drive a wedge between them. They are not, the objection claims, the same type of thing.

Note that the objection can, and indeed should, concede that the bodily changes are essential to emotions. On the one hand, it seems that what makes it the case that you are scared when escaping, as opposed to only acting on a belief that the animal is dangerous, is that your body is undergoing these changes—notwithstanding your lack of awareness. On the other hand, the bodily changes are essential to the explanation of affect: there simply cannot be any feeling or experience of your body when undergoing these changes, unless these changes occur. The objection denies only that the bodily changes, and the feeling or experience, are the same type of thing. In effect, it splits emotions into two distinct components. Certainly you can understand how another can undergo that part of an emotion consisting in bodily changes: a type of behaviour. That has never been in issue. But it is still the case that the only feeling or experience you experience is that which you have: your own. We are no better placed to solve the conceptual problem than we ever were.

In essence, the objection blocks the solution by re-introducing the ontological distinction between experience and behaviour within the account of emotions. But the difference this makes to the account itself is, in a sense, one of emphasis. We can use the notion of priority to explain what is at stake. The account of emotions I suggested begins with a basic conception of an emotion as a whole bodily state. This state consists in bodily changes which feel, or are experienced as being, a certain way from the inside: the bodily changes, and the feeling or experience, are bound together as one. Of course, we can distinguish them should we wish. But in so doing, we are distinguishing among aspects of one thing: an emotion. So the respect in which the bodily changes, and the feeling or experience, are alike has priority over the respect in which they are different. They are both equally and unambiguously aspects of an emotion, and in this way, ontologically on a par. The account of emotions suggested by the objection, in contrast, begins with a basic commitment to an ontological distinction between experience and behaviour. It then conceives of emotions as consisting in two distinct components: bodily changes, and a feeling or experience.
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The bodily changes, and the feeling or experience, are certainly ontologically alike in that they are both components of an emotion. But the respect in which they are different has priority.

How can we decide between these two accounts? In principle, we can adopt either. Neither has established that we must think of emotions as it claims we in fact do. So to try to meet the objection, and solve the problem, I shall attempt two things. The first is philosophical: I shall suggest a way to develop the idea that the bodily changes, and the feeling or experience, are bound together as one thing. The second is more descriptive: I hope only to point out that, however intuitive the ontological distinction seems in the abstract, we do not obviously cleave to it in practice.

So first, how to develop the idea that the bodily changes, and the feeling or experience, are bound together as one thing? The key idea is that it is a bodily feeling or experience that is in question.

Some of the bodily changes, like a change in hormone balance, underlie certain feelings or experiences. But other of the bodily changes, like a bodily configuration or movement, are what the feeling or experience is of. Given this, one way that the bodily changes, and the feeling or experience, are bound together is that some of the bodily changes are constitutive of the content of the feeling or experience. We can make this point side-ways on, as theorists. But it is also phenomenologically salient: it is perfectly apparent to the subject.

Some emotions, like joy, are a pleasure to experience. Some, like sadness, are not. Some, like anger, can be either pleasurable or wretched: it depends, among other things, on what you are angry about. Of course, part of what is nice when you are joyful, but not nice when you are sad, is whatever it is you are joyful or sad about. But still, the experience itself has a particular valence. In this, emotions are similar to sensations like pleasure and pain. And just as it is apparent to the subject that whether she has received a loving caress or a blow to the head is not incidental to the pleasurable or painful nature of her sensations, so too it is apparent to the subject that the changes her body undergoes are not incidental to her emotional feeling or experience. This is why, for instance, you might try to ‘keep smiling’, as we say, in order to stay feeling cheery; or you might try to control your shakes and sobs, and calm your breathing, in order to diminish your feeling of upset. So the bodily changes, and the feeling or experience, are bound together because the bodily changes are what is felt or experienced: they are encompassed by the feeling or experience.

This idea may seem too simple to carry much weight. Compare,
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for instance, seeing an object. According to some realist theories of perception, the object is what is seen, and so constitutive of the content of the visual experience: it is encompassed by the visual experience. But even if this allows us to make sense of the idea that the experience and the object are bound together as one thing—a seeing of an object—it is not likely to make us think that the object seen, and the experience of seeing it, are the same type of thing.

But body awareness is importantly different from visual experience. In vision, the object seen is presented as located relative to, and so as distinct from, the subject or origin of the visual experience: the experience is perspectival. Moreover, the experience clearly belongs to the subject or origin of the experience, not to its object. This is not so in body awareness. The object of body awareness is not presented as located relative to, and so as distinct from, the subject or origin of the awareness: the experience is not perspectival. Through body awareness, you experience particular bodily changes and sensations as happening to, and located in, your body, and overall feelings as encompassing it. Phenomenologically, the feeling or experience is presented as belonging not just to the subject of the feeling or experience, but also to the object: the body itself. So the feeling or experience of an emotion is bodily in two senses. It is of the body, and it is in the body.

This can help to develop the idea that the bodily changes, and the feeling or experience, are the same type of thing. For they are bound together not only because some of the bodily changes are what the feeling or experience is of. They are bound together because both the bodily changes, and the feeling or experience, are presented as belonging to the body: both are properties of the body. In this sense, they are ontologically on a par: aspects of the state the subject’s body is in.

Second, is it correct that, in practice, we apply the ontological distinction to our own emotions? Even if our use of our bodies in pretence suggests that we do, there is another, arguably more basic, dimension of our practice that suggests that we do not: our use of our bodies to communicate our emotions to others.

Sometimes your body communicates your emotions unbeknownst to you. You may be paying no attention to how your body appears to another. But sometimes you are fully aware of what your body is communicating: you can be aware of yourself as an other to others. So consider, for instance, feeling delighted at a child’s spontaneous gift of a drawing. Joy comes over your body and face. You naturally smile, exclaim, and so on. But perhaps you exaggerate the expression somewhat, or turn to face the child directly, to ensure that
she appreciates it. Or perhaps you try to soften your expression, or turn away slightly. You want to communicate your pleasure, but this child is always seeking attention, and must not be overly encouraged. Or perhaps you just allow your joy to run its natural course. You neither need, nor want, to do anything about it at all.

In such contexts, you communicate your emotion simply by allowing another to observe it: it is as if you literally say with your body 'This is what I'm feeling'. The idea that only one component of your emotion is observable, while the other component is kept securely hidden from view, does not occur: the ontological distinction has no place in your thinking. Needless to say, it is still the case that, in observing your emotion, another cannot have your bodily feeling or experience. Nor, at least in the normal course of affairs, can she be aware of your body from the inside. But she nonetheless appears able to observe your emotion—nothing partial, nothing less—perfectly well. That is how it is communicated.

On the one hand, we can understand how the bodily changes, and the bodily feeling or experience, could be bound together as one thing: a whole bodily state. On the other hand, in at least one dimension of our practice, we seem to think of our own emotions in just this way. Of course, the bodily changes, and the bodily feeling or experience, can be distinguished. But for both these reasons, it is open to us to hold that in the first instance, they are distinguished as the same type of thing. Both are aspects of a whole bodily state: an emotion.

But if this is right, then the objection lacks motivation. There is no reason to concede it. You conceive of the bodily feeling or experience that you have, and the bodily changes that others observe, as the same type of thing: an emotion. Given this, there is nothing problematic in understanding how the bodily feeling or experience that you have, and the bodily changes of another that you observe, could be the same type of thing: an emotion. Emotions are observational. They solve the conceptual problem.

Note that the solution requires only that emotions can, in principle, be both experienced and observed. It does not require that every emotion is observable. Nor does it require that every bodily state that appears to be an emotion, whether by design or by happenstance, genuinely is.

What, finally, is the relevance of the emotions to the epistemological problem of other minds? If emotions are observable, then it is possible to claim that you can know, or be justified in believing, that another has a mind because you observe it. But the worth of this answer will yet depend on how you can know, or be justified in
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believing, anything on the basis of perception. And there is still a practical, if not philosophical, problem about other minds in particular. Unlike inanimate objects, people are prone to pretend.

I have tried to argue that a direct, empiricist solution to the conceptual problem of other minds demands that states of mind can be either experienced or observed, and that some emotions meet this requirement. But even if this is true of these emotions, it may not be true of other states of mind. So how can this solution be extended?

When explaining the nature of the problem, I suggested that if you have the concept of a subject of experience, then no contradiction ensues from the claim that what it is for another to be in pain, say, is for there to be pain, but for there not to be. That is, if you have the concept of such a subject, then you can understand what a type of experience is from your own case alone. So perhaps we can use the emotions, in all their public manifestation, to generate the concept of a subject. We could then dispense with the demand for publicity.

Pursuing this suggestion would have the result that our basic concept of a subject is a subject of emotions. Certainly this has some developmental plausibility. But the consequences are not negligible. The emotions in question are whole bodily states consisting of naturally occurring bodily changes which feel, or are experienced as being, a certain way from the inside. If our basic concept of a subject is a subject of these emotions, then this subject is a body capable of instantiating these emotions. That is, a body which is, more or less, human—like us.

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Bibliography

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